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ABSTRACT: Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willing-
ness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper
an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues
are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to
be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification
of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions
of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that
our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellec-
tual virtuousness.
I. INTRODUCTION AND FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM
It is beyond doubt that ‘In praise of the cognitive emotions’ (1977) is one of the
most creative and pioneering publications of Israel Scheffler. As the title indi-
cates, in this paper the view is defended that various emotions serve the aims of
cognition. Scheffler is explicitly not suggesting that emotions can be reduced to
cognitions, nor that cognitions can be reduced to emotions. Neither does he want
to deny that our emotions can have a derailing or disrupting influence on our
reasoning, judging and deciding. His main aim is to contest the stereotypical
emotion-cognition dichotomy. Our emotional life and our cognitive endeavors
are no hostile worlds apart. On the contrary, certain emotions are integral and
sustaining components of processes of rational judgment and decision making.
To make this thesis plausible, Scheffler gives an illuminating description of
the various roles of emotion in cognition. Among other things, he draws our
attention to the indispensible function of the so-called rational passions (cf. 
pp. 4–5). As examples of such passions he mentions a love of truth, a contempt
for lying, a concern for accuracy in observation and inference, a disgust at
evasion, admiration of theoretical achievements and respect for the considered
arguments of others. Together these emotions constitute, as R.S. Peters once
wrote, “the passionate side of the life of reason” (1970, p. 68).
Rational passions, if conceived as dispositional emotions, are in fact traits of
character. In his article Scheffler uses the term ‘rational character’, but normally
the traits at issue are called intellectual virtues. That such virtues are identical
with rational passions, is already shown by their appellations. Often used names
of intellectual virtues, which include ‘an abhorrence of irrelevance’, ‘a concern
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for consistency’, ‘respect for evidence’ and ‘a devotion to truth’, are clear indi-
cations of rational passions. In other designations of intellectual virtues, like
‘open-mindedness’, ‘intellectual honesty’, ‘thoroughness’ and ‘clarity’, the refer-
ence to rational passions is less pronounced. Yet these virtues are unmistakably
also composed of such emotions. Open-mindedness, for example, can hardly be
conceived without an aversion of prejudice, a commitment to tolerance regard-
ing rival opinions, and a repugnance towards ignoring critical objections. And
how can someone be a bearer of the intellectual virtue of clarity without having
a heart-felt aversion towards woolly or obscure language?
With reference to the relevant passages of Scheffler’s paper, we shall give a
more elaborate description of the specific nature of rational passions or intellec-
tual virtues. First, in section II, we will try to elucidate in what respects intellectual
virtues should be distinguished from moral virtues. This comparative analysis,
we hope, will make clear what we mean when we call a trait of character an
intellectual virtue. After that, in section III, we will strive to deepen our insight
into the nature of intellectual virtues by eliminating several (possible) misunder-
standings. For example, we shall argue that our concept of an intellectual virtue
should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness,
as well as maintain that certain virtues of will power are often mistakenly
regarded as intellectual virtues.
Our analysis is not meant to be a purely theoretical undertaking, but an
attempt to shed light on an important aim of education. According to a student
of Scheffler, the philosopher Harvey Siegel, critical thinking is a fundamental
educational ideal that is composed of two basic aspects, viz. the reason assess-
ment component and the critical spirit component (cf. 1988, pp. 32–42). The
former component roughly consists in the ability to assess reasons according to
appropriate principles, that is the ability to determine to what extent the reasons
offered do really justify certain beliefs, claims or actions. The critical thinker,
however, is not only able to assess reasons properly, he is also disposed or
inclined to do so. Siegel connects this second component, the critical attitude,
with the rational passions. Indeed, according to him these passions “constitute
and instantiate the critical attitude” (p. 40). If this account of critical thinking
cuts any ice, our analysis of intellectual virtues can be understood as an elucida-
tion of an essential component of an often praised educational ideal.
II. INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUES
Scheffler draws a distinction between intellectual and moral virtues. He uses the
terms ‘rational character’ and ‘intellectual conscience’ with reference to the
former group of virtues, whereas he reserves the terms ‘moral character’ and
‘moral conscience’ for the latter group. Other authors, however, in particular
Karl Popper (cf. 1981/82), R.F Dearden (cf. 1984) and Anthony Quinton (cf.
1987), are inclined to consider intellectual virtues as moral virtues. To be sure,
they do not deny that the group of intellectual virtues has certain distinctive fea-
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tures. But in their view this only means that this group of virtues should be
understood as a specific subclass within a larger class of moral virtues.
In this conception tenable? Are intellectual virtues actually moral virtues? Or
can we indicate certain criteria on the basis of which these two groups of virtues
should be distinguished? To begin with, there is a certain similarity between both
groups of character traits. Both moral and intellectual virtues correspond with
certain rules (norms, criteria, principles). The moral virtue of honesty for example,
correlates with the rule that forbids us to steal or to cheat. And the moral virtue
of impartiality or formal justice corresponds with the principle that prohibits us
from treating equals unequally and unequals equally. In the same way we can
lay down for every intellectual virtue one or more corresponding rules. Open-
mindedness, for example, correlates with the duty to examine rival views as
objectively as possible, to be open to criticism, and to seriously assess the force
of counter-arguments. Or take the virtue of intellectual honesty. This trait, too, is
connected to rules, amongst which the duty not to cover up our private doubts
about our views, to admit frankly our errors in reasoning, and not to smuggle
away unwelcome evidence. 
However, the relationship between moral and intellectual virtues goes beyond
this formal correspondence with certain rules. Distinctive of the bearer of these
virtues is that such a person has internalized the rules in question. Perhaps we
can even state that acquiring moral and intellectual virtues on the one hand, and
internalizing the corresponding rules on the other, boils down to the same thing.
These processes of internalization involve the development of emotions, like
certain feelings of respect and admiration, love and concern, repugnance and
contempt. These emotions motivate the person intrinsically to observe and uphold
the rules at issue. And precisely such activating emotions are the constituents of
both moral and intellectual virtues.
Obviously we cannot conclude on the basis of these points of similarity that
intellectual virtues should be regarded as (a subclass of) moral virtues. However,
the described relationship enables us to understand the outline of the argument
of authors like Dearden and Quinton. It goes without saying that the correspond-
ing rules of moral virtues are typical moral rules. For the sake of convenience,
we will call the rules that correspond to intellectual virtues rational rules. Now,
what the authors mentioned argue is that rational rules are in fact genuine moral
(or ethical) rules. From which it is then concluded that the corresponding traits
of character are genuine moral virtues.
But what precisely are the arguments of Dearden and Quinton for this view?1
And can their arguments stand the test of criticism? The first argument that we
will discuss is put forward by Dearden (1984, pp. 105–106). We are, he argues,
normally inclined to connect moral rules exlusively with the sphere of action,
with what we do in the world. Yet it is undeniable that there are also certain nor-
mative requirements for what goes on in our minds, in particular for the proper
formation of beliefs. Examples of such requirements are the rule that prescribes
us to give due weight to relevant evidence, the rule that forbids us to take a
biased view towards new theories, or the rule that requires us to revise our
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beliefs in the light of sound counter-arguments. And it is striking that the lan-
guage of these normative requirements is the same as the language of ordinary
ethics. With regard to both our actions and our cognitive activities, we speak in
terms of duties, obligations, and even, correlatively, of rights. According to
Dearden, this linguistic resemblance is a good reason to consider the normative
requirements for the formation of beliefs as moral rules. Together these norms
constitute a genuine ethics, and not an ordinary ethics of action but an ethics of
belief.
We agree with Dearden that certain rules are applicable to the formation and
maintenance of our beliefs and convictions. Earlier we called such normative
requirements ‘rational rules’. We can also agree with the indicated resemblance
between these norms and moral rules. In the description of examples of rational
rules given above, we have ourselves used the term ‘duty’ several times. Still,
we do not think that this linguistic resemblance is a convincing reason for con-
sidering rational rules to be moral rules or, consequently, for regarding intellec-
tual virtues as moral virtues. Take for example the rules of a game. These rules,
too, can be expressed in terms of duties, obligations and corresponding rights.
Nevertheless, no one is inclined to regard such rules as moral. We could possibly
maintain that the participants of the game are morally obliged to observe the
rules of that game. And in a similar way it is perhaps our moral duty to observe
rational rules in the formation of our beliefs. But the fact, if it is one, that such
moral ‘meta’-duties regarding the observance of certain rules obtain, does not
turn these rules into moral rules.
Dearden’s second argument is also a kind of argument by analogy (1984, 
pp. 105–109, 119). Observing rational rules, like complying with moral rules, has
certain effects on character. Teaching children to stick to rational rules, in partic-
ular by habituation, is not simply a matter of transmitting accurate information,
but involves ipso facto the cultivation of traits of character. According to
Dearden, this resemblance is also a good reason to regard the normative require-
ments for the formation of beliefs as moral or ethical rules. And because of this
he typifies the effects of observing such rules as “a development of moral char-
acter.” (p. 119).
We think that Dearden rightly points to the similar effects of the systematic
observance of rational and moral rules. We ourselves argued above that the
internalization of both groups of rules can be conceived as the development and
establishment of traits of character. However, in our opinion this resemblance is
not a convincing reason for incorporating rational rules into the class of moral
rules. Again, a comparison with another type of rules can illustrate our objec-
tion. The observance of rules of etiquette, too, has possible effects on character.
Teaching such rules consists in the cultivation of a specific trait of character, that
could be called the virtue of mannerliness. Yet the rules of etiquette are not
moral rules, even though there can be good moral reasons to observe the proper
forms under certain circumstances. Therefore, we cannot infer from the resem-
blance in question that the virtue of mannerliness is in fact a moral virtue.
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A final argument for regarding rational rules as moral rules refers to the
effects of our beliefs and convictions on the lives of others. Both Dearden (1984,
pp. 104–105) and Quinton (1987, pp. 38–41) put forward this argument. But
because the line of reasoning of the latter is more elaborated, we will concen-
trate on his paper.
What Quinton tries to make plausible is “the general correctness of the
assumption that my defective beliefs are harmful to others” (p. 14). In support of
this thesis, he produces two arguments. Firstly, he argues that our actions which
are based on false or unreasonable beliefs, can be directly disadvantageous to
others. This holds in particular for our actions that are intended to promote the
interests of our fellow man. If such actions are inspired by incorrect or
unjustified beliefs, there is a considerable chance that we will do more harm than
good. Quinton’s second argument is both more important and more complex.
Normally we will benefit from having true beliefs. For if we rely on false beliefs
about the outcomes of our actions, we will usually not achieve the ends we have
in view. According to Quinton, we can infer from this that on the whole the
expression of our false beliefs will be indirectly disadvantageous to others.
Under normal circumstances other persons will be inclined to accept our com-
municated beliefs, in particular when we speak with trusted authority. And if
those others subsequently base their actions on such false beliefs, they also run
the risk of not getting what they want or value.
Because of this twofold connection between our beliefs and the welfare of
others, Quinton holds the view that it is morally desirable to have true or
justified beliefs. And in order to form such beliefs, the best thing we can do is to
observe the rational rules. For Quinton this is the central reason to regard these
rules as moral rules. Because of the fact that the observance of rational rules is
all in all in the interest of other people, together those rules constitute an ethics.
And not an ethics in a metaphorical or figurative sense, but in the literal meaning
of that term.
In our opinion, Quinton’s thesis that in general our defective beliefs are
harmful to others is plausible, in particular when we take into account all his
subtle qualifications and reservations. And the fact that the interests of others are
at stake is certainly an important moral reason for observing rational rules in the
formation of our beliefs. But the conclusion that is drawn form this, namely that
such rules are genuine moral rules, can hardly be maintained. Let us once again
make a comparison with another type of rule, in this case traffic rules. The general
observance of such rules undoubtedly serves the interests of all road users.
Because these interests are at stake, we have a moral duty to comply with traffic
rules. But this does not imply that such rules are themselves moral rules. On the
contrary, it is counter-intuitive to regard traffic rules as a subclass of moral rules.
In short, Quinton and Dearden have convinced us that the observance of ratio-
nal rules, and consequently also the cultivation of the corresponding virtues,
deserves our moral concern. But their arguments for the thesis that rational rules
are actually moral rules, and that therefore the intellectual virtues should be con-
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ceived as moral virtues, are less convincing. However, the fact that the argu-
ments produced are unsound obviously does not entail that the thesis defended is
untenable. So the question arises: are Dearden and Quinton correct concerning
the thesis itself?
In a certain respect this question should be answered in the affirmative. As we
have seen, intellectual virtue-names refer to certain traits of character. And it is
not at all odd or implausible to regard many of those traits, for instance open-
mindedness, intellectual honesty, tolerance against rival views, intellectual
modesty and intellectual fairness, as moral virtues too. In other words, it would
be a mistake to consider the traits that are normally designated by intellectual
virtue-names to be a separate class, completely distinct from the group of traits
that can be regarded as moral virtues. The former group of traits is, at least for
the most part,2 a subclass of the latter group. In this respect many intellectual
virtues are indeed genuine moral virtues. And the same goes, mutatis mutandis,
for the corresponding rules. The rules that correspond with intellectual virtues
can mostly also be conceived as genuine moral rules.
The problem is, however, that up to now we have not found a good argument
for this view. At least the arguments of Dearden and Quinton have not con-
vinced us of the correctness of the thesis that intellectual virtues are in fact
moral virtues. Yet in our opinion such a reason can be given. And this argument
we find, paradoxically enough, by defending the thesis that in another respect
intellectual virtues are not moral virtues. What respect is this?
The distinction between intellectual and moral virtues can not be clarified by
concentrating on the traits of character referred to, but only by shifting our atten-
tion to the designation of these traits. For calling a trait of character an intellec-
tual virtue is quite different from calling a trait of character a moral virtue. Or, to
put it more precisely, the semantic rules for using the expressions ‘intellectual
virtue’ and ‘moral virtue’ are not the same.3 This difference in designation is not
easy to clarify, but we hope that our guess will hit the mark.
In every systematically elaborated ethics of virtue particular traits of character
are considered cardinal virtues. Characteristic of such virtues is that they cannot
be derived from one another, whereas all the other virtues can be derived from
or shown to be forms of them. The rules that correspond with cardinal virtues
are known as basic or fundamental principles. Such principles also cannot be
derived from one another. But it is possible to derive the rules that correspond
with the remaining virtues from those basic principles.
Making use of these classical distinctions, we want to defend the view that the
group of intellectual virtues is based on and unified by the cardinal virtue of
concern and respect for truth. The fundamental principle that corresponds to this
virtue is, roughly speaking, the abstract principle that urges us to investigate as
well as possible whether our non-trivial beliefs are true or well-justified. The group
of moral virtues is, in our opinion, also sustained and united by one cardinal virtue,
in this case the complex virtue of concern and respect for persons. This virtue, too,
corresponds with a basic principle, namely the compounded principle that exhorts
us to promote the well-being of others and to respect their intrinsic dignity.
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If this analysis is on the right track, we can elucidate in what respect intellec-
tual virtues are different from moral virtues. If we designate a trait of character
as an intellectual virtue, we indicate that this quality can be drived from, or is a
specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. If we desig-
nate a trait of character as a moral virtue on the other hand, we assume that this
quality is based on, or is a form of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for
persons. In this, we think, lies the distinction we are looking for: by using the
expressions ‘intellectual virtue’ or ‘moral virtue’, we place the relevant trait of
character in a different context of justification, in such a manner that we consider
that trait a specification of a different cardinal virtue. In the same way the dis-
tinction between the corresponding rules can be explained. By designating a rule
as a rational one, this rule is conceived as derived from, or as a specific form of,
the basic principle that corresponds with the cardinal virtue of concern and
respect for truth. And if we designate a rule as a moral one, we connect this rule
in a similar manner with the fundamental principle that correlates with the cardi-
nal virtue of concern and respect for persons.
At the same time the revealed distinction enables us to explain that in a
certain respect intellectual virtues are actually moral virtues too. Traits of char-
acter that we designate as intellectual virtues, can often also be regarded as
specifications of the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for persons. Take for
example tolerance towards rival views. This trait of character is rightly consid-
ered an intellectual virtue. For such a trait can easily be derived from, or under-
stood as a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern and respect for truth. If
we really want our beliefs to be true or well-justified, we should be tolerant
towards views that challenge our beliefs. At the same time, however, we can
justify this form of tolerance by appealing to the belief that it is better to get
someone to do something by reason than by force. And this is clearly a moral
consideration that is based on the fundamental principle of respect for persons.4
In this respect an intellectual virtue can be a genuine moral virtue.
What insights into the nature of intellectual virtues are generated by our com-
parative analysis? We argued that the corresponding rules of intellectual virtues
are derived from the basic principle that relates to the cardinal virtue of concern
and respect for truth. As such, rational rules specify what is involved in investi-
gating as well as possible whether our non-trivial bliefs are true or well-justified.
To put it differently, the observance of rational rules fosters the proper formation
of beliefs. Intellectual virtues are passions that motivate us to observe and
respect such rules. Therefore, practising these virtues will increase the chance5
that our opinion-forming practices result in beliefs that are true or at least well-
justified. This is precisely the raison d’être of intellectual virtues.
III. POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS
Our view concerning the nature of intellectual virtues can be made more com-
pelling by eliminating three (possible) misunderstandings. Characteristic of the
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misconceptions that we will discuss is the entanglement of issues that should be
carefully distinguished.
In the first place there is the risk of confusing our concept of an intellectual
virtue with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. By comparing
intellectual virtues with moral virtues, we have tried to explicate, so to speak,
the content of the relevant concept. In performing this comparative analysis, we
have mentioned examples of intellectual virtues, like open-mindedness, clarity,
precision, intellectual honesty and thoroughness. By making use of these exam-
ples, our conceptual analysis is at the same time indicative of our normative con-
ception of intellectual virtuousness. And so it is easy, but nevertheless a mistake, to
regard such a conception as part of the content of the concept under consideration.
To illustrate this point, let us assume that we want to analyse another concept,
for instance our concept of a right. Then our question is: what do we mean when
we say that P has a right to x? In our answer we refer to the fact that P in such a
case is able to claim x and, what’s more, that this claim is legitimate or justified.
Both these characteristics are as it were part of the content of the concept of a
right. But when we indicate which claims of P we think are justified, or to what
in our view P has a legitimate claim, we are presenting a normative conception
of rights. In a similar way we can clarify the concept of an intellectual virtue by
showing that such traits are specifications of concern and respect for truth and,
moreover, that they are constituted by passions which motivate us to observe
rational rules. But as soon as we indicate which traits according to us can be
derived from concern and respect for truth, or which rules we have to observe in
order to put ourselves in the best position for generating true beliefs, then we are
defending a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness.6
This distinction makes it possible that some will agree with our analysis of the
concept of an intellectual virtue, but in spite of that hold a different normative
conception of intellectual virtuousness. For example, suppose that someone is
influenced by the ideas of the German philosophers of life (cf. Bollnow, 1958)
and takes the view that life is mysterious, obscure and ambivalent. This outlook
on life induces him to doubt whether clarity and precision are actually intellec-
tual virtues, but not because he rejects our conceptual analysis. He, too,
acknowledges that intellectual virtues are traits of character which, if put into
practice, increase the chance of forming true or well-justified beliefs. He only
denies that clarity and precision will increase this chance, since he believes that
analytical distinctions, unambiguous concepts and perspicuous arguments are
more likely to hamper than to further real insight into life. Or suppose that
someone, after reading the works of Thomas S. Kuhn, questions the value of
open-mindedness and intellectual modesty. Kuhn taught him that scientists,
despite relevant criticism and undermining evidence, often stubbornly stick to
pioneering theories which are vindicated in the end. From that he concludes that
bias and intellectual vanity should be considered valuable qualities. Such a
person defends a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness which is
clearly at variance with our view. Nevertheless, it is possible that he gives his
unqualified assent to our explanation of the underlying concept. In short, criti-
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cism of our examples of intellectual virtues is one thing, criticism of our analysis
of the concept is quite another thing.
A second misunderstanding that must be avoided consists in confusing ratio-
nal rules with criteria for the assessment of reasons. Siegel, as we have seen,
makes a distinction between two aspects of critical thinking, the reason assess-
ment component and the critical spirit component. He typifies the former as “the
ability to assess reasons and their warranting force” (1988, p. 35). According to
Siegel, the critical thinker is able to evaluate the epistemic force of reasons prop-
erly, that is to determine whether the reasons for certain claims are good or bad,
relevant or irrelevant, true or false, strong or weak, important or trivial, convinc-
ing or dubious. Such an assessment is governed by certain standards or princi-
ples, which we could call epistemic criteria. Under this heading not only the
general rules of formal and informal logic can be subsumed, but also the princi-
ples that are constitutive of different forms of thinking, for example the criteria
that determine what counts as a good reason in a scientific, moral or aesthetic
discourse.
As argued earlier, rational rules should be conceived as specifications of the
basic principle that urges us to investigate as well as possible whether our non-
trivial beliefs are true or well-justified. Such an inquiry roughly consists in the
critical assessment of the epistemic force of the reasons for our beliefs. And
because in reason assessment an appeal is made to epistemic principles, there is
the risk of identifying such criteria with rational rules. That misunderstanding
has to be avoided. Rational rules should be distinguished carefully from epis-
temic criteria, though a close relationship between these two types of rules is
undeniable.
The observance of the rules that correspond with intellectual virtues, as we
have seen, fosters the proper formation of beliefs. In fact this means that follow-
ing rational rules increases the chance that reasons are assessed properly, accord-
ing to appropriate epistemic criteria. Take for example the intellectual virtue of
the willingness to participate in discussions. This virtue corresponds to the rule
that encourages us to take part in rational debates and to submit our beliefs to a
critical public. It goes without saying that this rational rule can not itself be con-
ceived as an epistemic principle. But at the same time it is also plain that the
observance of this rule increases the chance that our understanding of the epis-
temic force of our reasons will be more profound or that our assessment will be
based on appropriate epistemic criteria. Or take the virtue of intellectual fairness.
The corresponding rule obliges us to do justice to the views and arguments of
others. This rational rule, too, is not itself an epistemic principle. But if we
observe this rule, we will apply the relevant epistemic criteria impartially, with
the result that the chance of improper reason assessment decreases.
The distinction between rational rules and epistemic criteria enables us to
shed some light on the problem of the so-called generalizability of critical think-
ing (cf. McPeck, 1990). Some authors are of the opinion that critical thinking
should be interpreted in terms of skills that are applicable to all disciplines or
domains of inquiry. They refer in particular to the skills required to test argu-
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ments against the rules of applied logic, both formal and informal. Other
authors, however, contest the value and even the possibility of such general or
subject-neutral skills. They defend the view that critical thinking is composed of
patterns of reasoning that vary from field to field. In particular they refer to the
different forms of knowledge and understanding, which are supposed to have
their own peculiar standards or principles.
Siegel (cf. 1991) has rightly pointed out that this discussion is concentrated on
the reason assessment component. To put it in our words: the central issue is
whether the epistemic criteria are subject-neutral or subject-specific. The ques-
tion, however, whether the other component, the critical spirit, is generalizable,
has been by and large ignored. And once this question is raised, the answer is,
according to Siegel, fairly obvious: “The critical spirit is fully generalizable”
(1991, p. 26). We think that Siegel is quite right about this point. The critical
spirit is composed of intellectual virtues. And no matter how we think about
epistemic criteria, the rules that correspond with these virtues are not limited to
any field of inquiry whatsoever. Depending on the content of our beliefs, the
epistemic criteria may vary. But the rational rules are invariably applicable.
Finally, we want to discuss a third misunderstanding. It is not unusual to
regard traits like courage, patience, self-control, perseverance and even temper-
ance as intellectual virtues too (cf. Dearden, 1984, pp. 106, 119; Degenhardt,
1986, p. 111; Quinton, 1987, pp. 49, 51). In our view, however, this classifica-
tion is rather unfortunate. We prefer to include the listed traits in a separate
class, which is generally labelled the virtues of will power. Then the question
arises: what exactly is the difference between this group of virtues on the one
hand, and the traits that are rightly considered intellectual virtues on the other?
The answer to this question can be found by first making explicit the differ-
ences between the virtues of will power and typical moral virtues. These two
groups of traits should also be conceived as separate classes. This is shown by the
very fact that the bearer of the virtues of will power by definition has a strong
character, but, unlike the bearer of moral virtues, not necessarily has a good 
character. Perseverance, industriousness, iron self-control and resolution in the
face of hardship, are all too often qualities of brute dictators and cunning crimi-
nals. But it can hardly be maintained that such persons have a good character.
That the bearer of the virtues of will power is not necessarily a morally good
person, can be explained in the following way. As already stated, moral virtues
correspond with moral rules. The virtue of fidelity, for example, corresponds
with the moral rule that prescribes us to keep our promises. And the virtue of
forgivingness is connected to the moral rule that encourages us to renounce
revenge. Therefore, practising these virtues is by definition in accordance with
moral rules. And since such rules lay down which behavior is morally right or
desirable, practising these virtues consists in performing actions that meet these
moral qualifications (in any case prima facie).
The virtues of will power, however, lack this logical connection with moral
rules. For what are the duties, obligations or rules of supererogation that are
inextricably connected to such virtues as persistence, patience or self-control?
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There are none. Hence, practising these virtues does not have to be in accor-
dance with moral rules. And because of this, exercising the virtues of will power
does not necessarily consists in performing actions that are morally right or
desirable (not even prima facie). A dictator, for example, will show persever-
ance in pursuing his immoral goals. And a criminal has to exercise patience in
order to make a big haul.
Now, if we compare the virtues of will power with intellectual virtues, we can
reveal similar differences. Just as the bearer of the virtues of will power does not
have by definition a good character, the character of such a person is not neces-
sarily intellectually virtuous either. On the contrary, someone  may have a strong
character and at the same time be completely unvirtuous from an intellectual
viewpoint. A paradigmatic example is the doctrinal or dogmatic person (cf.
Spiecker, 1991a, pp. 17–20; 1991b, pp. 97–98, 102–106). The character of such
a person is composed of a number of intellectual vices, like closed-mindedness,
intellectual intolerance and prejudice. Nevertheless, he can be remarkably strong-
willed, not only in the public domain of action but also in the more cognitive
sphere. For example, it can be expected that he will defend his doctrines with
great tenacity, dispute rival beliefs with striking perseverance, and keep his
creeping doubts about his own convictions effectively under control.
The fact that having the virtues of will power does not automatically make
someone intellectually virtuous, can also be explained by appealing to corre-
sponding rules. Virtues of will power are not only lacking corresponding moral
rules, they are also logically unconnected to rational rules. In this respect they
are essentially different from intellectual virtues. Unlike intellectual virtues, the
virtues of will power are not composed of passions that motivate us to observe
rational rules. Consequently, practising the virtues of will power, as was shown
by the example of the doctrinal person, can be in flat contradiction with rational
rules.
That traits like perseverance, steadfastness, courage and self-control should
not be considered intellectual virtues, does not alter the fact that these traits play
an important and even indispensable part in the proper assessment of the epis-
temic force of reasons. The building blocks of intellectual virtues, the rational
passions, can come into conflict with powerful counter-inclinations. Think, for
example, of our tendency to avoid threatening discussions, our aversion to the
uncomfortable state of doubt, our fear of being confronted with unpleasant
truths, our disinclination for exacting thinking, our passion for certainty, and our
disposition to join the prevailing view. What these inclinations have in common 
is that they hamper the proper formation of our beliefs. As Dearden rightly
observes, they are “typical human proclivities for going wrong in various ways
in forming beliefs” (1984, p. 103). To resist or withstand such disrupting counter-
inclinations, the virtues of will power are vital.7 Nevertheless, they are not
rightly regarded as intellectual virtues.
It was not our intention to criticize Scheffler’s view concerning the various
roles of emotion in cognition. On the contrary, the only thing we tried to do was
to develop further his brief but basic account of the rational passions. First we
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explained that rational passions are actually intellectual virtues or, perhaps better,
that intellectual virtues are composed of rational passions. Then we tried to elu-
cidate the specific nature of intellectual virtues by (a) making a comparison with
moral virtues and (b) eliminating three obvious misunderstandings. Our analysis
of intellectual virtues, however, is not only meant to be an elaboration of a small
piece of Scheffler’s work, it should also be regarded as an explication of the pas-
sions that pervade his entire oeuvre.
NOTES
1 Popper, too, defends the view that (particular) rational rules are genuine moral rules: “The princi-
ples that are constitutive of every rational discussion are ethical principles in the literal sense of the
word” (1981/82, p. 148). In this paper, however, clear arguments for this view are lacking.
Therefore, we will restrict ourselves to the publications of Dearden and Quinton.
2 The question is whether all traits of character that are regarded as intellectual virtues can also be
conceived as moral virtues. What should we think, for example, of clarity, precision and thorough-
ness? In our opinion, such qualities are rightly considered intellectual virtues. But intuitively we are
doubtful whether these traits can be regarded as moral virtues as well.
3 Compare in this respect the well-known distinction of Gottlob Frege between sense and reference.
The terms ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning star’ refer to the same object, namely the planet
Venus. But the sense (or meaning) of these terms is not the same. In other words, the distinction
between the morning star and the evening star is not located in the object referred to, but in the
respective designations of the object (or, as Frege would call it, in ‘the modes of presentation’).
4 Intellectual virtues are often justified in terms of respect for persons. See, for example, Popper
(1963, pp. 232–240), who connects the attitude of reasonableness with a “basically equalitarian and
humanitarian outlook”, and Siegel (1988, pp. 55–57), who defends the educational ideal of critical
thinking by appealing to the “Kantian principle of respect for persons”.
5 William Hare (1983, p. 31) rightly observes that the closed-minded person may hold or acquire true
beliefs, whereas the open-minded person may reject true beliefs or form opinions which are false.
Practising the intellectual virtue of open-mindedness only increases the chance of forming beliefs
that are true (or well-justified).
6 In particular when words with an evaluative or prescriptive meaning are examined (‘virtue’,
‘justice’, ‘moral’ etc.), there is the risk of confusing concepts and conceptions. A conceptual analysis
is often carried out by making explicit the rules for the correct use of the corresponding word. The
use of evaluative words, however, is not only guided by rules that determine which concept is
expressed, but also by rules that are tied up with normative conceptions. In such cases it is often
tempting, but nevertheless mistaken, to conceive the later rules as part of the concept under consider-
ation (cf. Steutel, 1991, pp. 86–89).
7 Elsewhere (cf. Steutel, 1988, pp. 106–111; 1992, pp. 72–81) we have explained that resisting or
overcoming counter-inclinations consists in applying all sorts of techniques of self-intervention. The
skills to apply such techniques in the appropriate circumstances, are central components of the
virtues of will power. In other words: contrary to virtues of will power, intellectual virtues are com-
posed of rational passions, whereas virtues of will power, contrary to intellectual virtues, are made
up of self-intervention skills.
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